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Abstract: In matters of responsibility, there are often two sides to the trans-
action: one party who holds another responsible, and the other who (ideally) 
takes responsibility for her conduct. The first side has been closely scrutinized 
in discussions of the nature of responsibility, due to the influential Straw-
sonian conjecture that an agent is responsible if and only if it is (in some 
sense) appropriate to hold her responsible. 
This preoccupation with holding responsible—with its focus on the sec-
ond-personal perspective and on responses like blame—contrasts with a 
relative neglect of the perspective of the agent and the role that she has to 
play by taking responsibility. I aim to show that this neglect is undeserved—
that taking responsibility is both distinct in character from holding responsi-
ble and fundamentally important in its own right. I develop a conception of 
taking responsibility that reveals an under-explored dimension of our respon-
sibility practices. 
 
In matters of responsibility, there are often two sides to the transaction: one party 
who holds another responsible, and the other who (ideally) takes responsibility for her 
conduct. The first side of this transaction has been closely scrutinized in discussions 
of the nature of responsibility, due in large part to the Strawsonian conjecture that an 
agent is responsible if and only if it is (in some sense) fitting or appropriate to hold her 
responsible—and further that what it is for an agent to be responsible perhaps just is 
for it to be appropriate to hold her responsible.1 According to this way of thinking, to 
understand what it is to hold someone responsible, and when it is appropriate to do 
so, is to understand what it is, in at least one central sense, to be responsible. 
This preoccupation with holding responsible—with its focus on the second- per-
sonal perspective, and on responses like blame, reproach, and sanction—contrasts 
with a relative neglect, in discussions of the nature of responsibility, of the perspective 
of the agent and the role that she has to play by taking responsibility. The latter per-
spective has, however, received considerably more attention in discussions of 
downstream topics like punishment, moral repair, and the moral emotions, which are 
seen to encompass a wider range of responses and activities than the narrower (and 
perhaps more fundamental) question of what it is to be responsible.  
 
1 The conjecture originates in Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment,” in Gary 
Watson (ed.), Free Will (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 2nd 
ed.), pp. 72-93. 
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For instance, punishment theorists examine the interactions between an agent’s 
responses to her own misconduct (remorse, reparation, etc.) and the appropriateness 
of sanctions2; reconciliation theorists offer accounts of how the agent can actively par-
ticipate in processes of apology, atonement, and relational repair3; and theorists of the 
emotions explore the complex range of attitudes (guilt, shame, remorse, (agent-)regret, 
pride, etc.) that we can have towards our own conduct.4 Given the range and richness 
of this work, it is striking—or at least, by the end of this paper I hope it will be strik-
ing—that efforts to understand the nature of responsibility in terms of the 
appropriateness of certain attitudes and responses have focused on the second-per-
sonal attitudes and responses associated with holding responsible (blame, reproach, 
etc.), largely to the exclusion of the attitudes and responses associated with taking re-
sponsibility. 
I aim to show that this neglect of the agent’s perspective is undeserved—that 
taking responsibility is both distinct in character from holding responsible and funda-
mentally important in its own right. To this end I will draw upon an idea that Joseph 
Raz has applied to the puzzling case of responsibility for inadvertent conduct, but I 
will repurpose this idea and apply it to ordinary deliberate conduct rather than inad-
vertence. In doing so, I will develop a conception of taking responsibility that reveals 
an under-explored dimension of our responsibility practices. 
If this effort succeeds, there will be two significant upshots for theoretical inquiry 
into responsibility and its associated responses and practices. The first and more 
straightforward is that taking responsibility turns out to be independently important 
and to deserve more focused theoretical attention than it has generally received. The 
second is that we have reason to suspect that efforts to understand the nature and 
conditions of responsibility solely in terms of the attitudes and responses associated 
with holding responsible—as productive and illuminating as these efforts have been—
cannot help but miss something vital. This will particularly be so if it should turn out, 
as I will briefly suggest in closing, that holding responsible and taking responsibility 
are not merely distinct and complementary but interactive and interdependent patterns 
 
2 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001); John Tasioulas, “Punishment and Repentance,” Phi-
losophy 81(2) (2006): pp. 279-322; Christopher Bennett, The Apology Ritual: A 
Philosophical Theory of Punishment (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008); Hannah Maslen, Remorse, Penal Theory and Sentencing (Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2015). 
3 See, e.g., Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrong-
doing (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Nick Smith, I 
Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008); Linda Radzik, Making Amends: Atonement in Morality, Law, and Politics (Ox-
ford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
4 See, e.g., Bernard Williams, “Moral Luck,” in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 20-39; John 
Deigh, “Love, Guilt, and the Sense of Justice,” in The Sources of Moral Agency (Cam-
bridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 39-64; Gabriele Taylor, 
Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford and New York: Clarendon 
Press, Oxford University Press, 1985). 
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of response. For in that case, responsibility ought to be understood as grounded in a 
more complex matrix of concerns and practices than has often been supposed. 
Two clarifications are in order at the outset. First, while I am broadly sympathetic 
to the Strawsonian project of seeking to understand the nature of responsibility in 
terms of the attitudes and responses that make up our responsibility practices, my aim 
here is neither to offer a defense of that project nor directly to consider the nature of 
responsibility. I will not here defend any view, for instance, on the question of whether 
the attitudes and responses associated with responsibility are better understood as 
somehow constitutive of responsibility, or rather merely as licensed by an independent 
status of responsibility.5 My aim is rather to shed light on a neglected aspect of our 
responsibility practices. This will naturally be of interest to Strawsonians who consider 
our responsibility practices to be the very essence of responsibility; but I hope it may 
also be of broader interest, given the importance of our responsibility practices in our 
moral and social lives. 
Second, while I will deny both that holding responsible is more fundamental than 
taking responsibility, and that taking responsibility is to be understood in terms of 
holding responsible, I do not mean to endorse the inverse claims that taking respon-
sibility is more fundamental than holding responsible, or that holding responsible is to 
be understood in terms of taking responsibility. My contention is rather that these two 
patterns of response are distinct and irreducible to one another, and that neither should 
be accorded theoretical priority over the other.  
 
1 Taking responsibility and holding oneself responsible 
First we need a clearer sense of the difference between ‘holding responsible’ and 
‘taking responsibility.’ While these expressions are suggestive in themselves, I am pro-
posing to use them as terms of art to capture a distinction that requires further 
explanation, especially as it can easily be overlooked. So far I have indicated that hold-
ing responsible is characteristically a second-personal way of responding to another 
agent’s conduct (as in blaming or reproaching6), whereas what I am calling taking 
 
5 For discussion of this question see, e.g., Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits 
of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” in Agency and Answerability (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 219-59, 222; R. Jay Wallace, Responsi-
bility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1994), pp. 1, 85-95. 
6 Or perhaps praising, crediting, and feeling gratitude, among a variety of other positive 
responses. There is an active controversy in the responsibility literature concerning 
whether praise, credit, and other positive responses count as ways of ‘holding respon-
sible,’ or whether only (some limited set of) negative responses (often identified as 
resentment, indignation, and guilt) have that status. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 5, p. 
61; Coleen Macnamara, “Holding Others Responsible,” Philosophical Studies 152 (2011): 
pp. 81-102, 89; Gary Watson, “Peter Strawson on Responsibility and Sociality,” in 
David Shoemaker & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 
Volume 2: “Freedom and Resentment” at 50 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), pp. 15-32, 28. While I incline towards the view that for many purposes it 
makes sense to count positive responses like praise and credit among the ways in which 
we hold one another responsible, there are also important differences between the 
negative and positive responses that make the question a complex one. As I do not 
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responsibility is a first-personal way in which the agent can respond to her own con-
duct (as in feeling sorry or apologizing7). But of course this is just a first step. 
To take the next step in drawing out this distinction, it is helpful to consider a 
doubt that immediately suggests itself: Perhaps there is fundamentally only one kind 
of response here, because taking responsibility is not in its essence distinct from hold-
ing responsible, but rather just boils down to holding oneself responsible. That is, perhaps 
the relevant first-personal responses are not different in kind from the second-per-
sonal ones (blaming, reproaching, etc.), but are rather simply self-directed versions of 
them. 
This thought is encouraged by the Strawsonian idea that holding someone re-
sponsible is essentially a matter of having the sort of emotional reaction towards them 
that comes in the personal, vicarious, and reflexive versions that Peter Strawson la-
beled resentment, indignation, and guilt, respectively—what he famously called the 
“reactive attitudes.”8 According to a simple version of this idea, my holding you re-
sponsible for your treatment of me is fundamentally a matter of (or involves, or is 
somehow closely connected to) my resenting you; my holding you responsible for your 
treatment of a third party is a matter of my feeling indignant towards you—which is 
another way of saying that that I feel resentment, on behalf of the third party, towards 
you; and my holding myself responsible for my treatment of another is a matter of my 
feeling guilty—which is another way of saying that I feel resentment, on behalf of that 
other, towards myself. This way of carving up the phenomena suggests the hypothesis 
that to take responsibility is nothing other than to hold oneself responsible, in partic-
ular by undertaking the emotional burden of guilt and being disposed to respond in 
the ways that are associated with a sense of guilt.  
But this, I contend, is mistaken. The goal of this section is thus to demonstrate 
that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between holding oneself responsible 
(in the Strawsonian sense just described) and the pattern of response that I am calling 
taking responsibility. The demonstration will proceed by illustrating a range of familiar 
attitudes and responses that we can, and at least sometimes do, take towards our own 
conduct, and by introducing some principled distinctions among those responses. Pro-
ceeding in this way will reveal a distinct set of attitudes and responses whose character 
and significance as a class have tended to be overlooked; along the way we will also 
designate a vocabulary to describe this relatively neglected category. 
A crucial reason to think that we have here two distinct patterns of response is 
that among the familiar ways in which we sometimes respond to our own conduct we 
 
intend to defend a view on this question here, I will focus throughout on negative 
responses. 
7 Or perhaps feeling pride and claiming credit; but for the reasons discussed in the 
previous footnote, the focus here will be on negative responses. 
8 In fact, Strawson conceived the reactive attitudes as a broader category, including in 
addition responses like hurt feelings and shame, as well as positive responses like grat-
itude, forgiveness, and love, see supra note 1, pp. 75, 79, 83-85. In the responsibility 
literature it has become common, due to the influence of Wallace and like-minded 
theorists working within the Strawsonian tradition, to limit discussion to negative atti-
tudes, and specifically to resentment, indignation, and guilt. See Wallace, supra note 5, 
pp. 62-73. On the question of whether positive responses should be counted among 
the ways in which we hold one another responsible, see supra note 6.  
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can differentiate two sorts of emotional reactions that are distinguished by their char-
acteristic foci or objects of concern. On the one hand are the emotional reactions that 
you, the active party, can have towards yourself as agent9; these include guilt, in the 
standard Strawsonian sense, and more generally self-directed anger, blame, frustration, 
and the like (perhaps also disappointment, contempt, and a range of other responses). 
These are self-directed versions of the attitudes that we take when holding another 
responsible, and they find natural expression in self-directed versions of the disposi-
tions and actions that are associated with holding another responsible, including 
reproach, sanction, and so on. The agent’s primary focus in these responses is on her-
self, her choices, and what she did. 
On the other hand are the emotional reactions that you, the active party, can have 
towards another person as someone affected by your conduct and as a party to the relationship 
that you stand in to them. Here anger, blame, and the like are clearly out of place. What 
is called for instead are what we might call (somewhat stipulatively, but I think without 
unduly straining familiar usage) contrition—or more colloquially, feeling sorry—towards 
the person your conduct has affected. Associated with this reaction are dispositions to 
apologize, to ‘undo’ the wrong, to make amends, and so on. The agent’s primary focus 
in these responses is on the other party, how her conduct has affected them, and the 
significance of this for their relations. 
The literature on blame, guilt, and other agent-focused responses is vast; by con-
trast, discussion of this second set of responses is sparse enough that I have resorted 
to terms—contrition, feeling sorry—that have no established theoretical usage. (I will 
come in a moment to the related phenomena of agent-regret and remorse.) Yet feeling 
sorry is, I suspect, at least for many people no less familiar than feeling guilty. And that 
these two responses are entirely distinct is apparent from everyday situations in which 
it is possible to feel sorry for something you don’t feel guilty for, and vice versa. 
Suppose you make plans to see a friend who is very eager to spend time with you, 
after having cancelled several previous meetings (all with excellent reason). As luck 
would have it, when the appointed time comes another legitimate crisis arises and you 
have no choice but regretfully to cancel again. In this kind of case it is a possible and 
indeed I believe a familiar reaction not to feel guilty at all (you had excellent reason to 
cancel—there’s nothing else you could reasonably have done), but at the same time to 
feel sorry towards your friend for letting her down again. And this feeling will tend to 
manifest itself in a disposition to apologize and offer explanations, a desire to ‘make it 
up to her,’ and so on, rather than in a disposition to reproach or sanction yourself. 
When you think about what happened, the focus will primarily be on your friend, your 
relationship, and the disappointment you have occasioned, rather than on yourself, 
your choices, or your conduct (though it is of course important that it was your conduct 
that occasioned this disappointment—in this way contrition is quite distinct from im-
personal regret). 
 
9 The term ‘agent’ is used here not in any technical sense but simply to designate the 
active party—that is, the party whose conduct or activity is the occasion for the atti-
tudes and responses in question. At this stage, for purposes of establishing the 
distinctness of the relevant types of response, we do not need to inquire further into 
the kind of agency or agential capacity that is necessary for the responses to be intelli-
gible or appropriate.  
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The claim here is not, to be clear, that the response just imagined is necessarily 
the most fitting or appropriate one, nor that other possible responses (like feeling 
guilty) would be unfitting or inappropriate. Moreover, I mean neither to suggest that 
this response would be the most common or typical response in this scenario, nor to 
make any conceptual claim about what it means to feel ‘sorry’ or ‘contrite.’ My more 
modest aim is rather to isolate and identify a type of response that is possible and 
intelligible (and, I venture, familiar) in this sort of scenario, and one that is distin-
guished—by its characteristic focus or object of concern, and in other ways—from 
agent-focused responses like (Strawsonian) guilt or self-blame. And to have a vocabu-
lary for speaking about the sort of response here distinguished, I propose stipulatively 
(but, I hope, without great strain or artificiality) to use the terms contrition or feeling sorry. 
What is at stake then are the possibility and the distinctiveness of the response de-
scribed, not its fittingness or appropriateness (nor the fittingness or appropriateness 
of alternative possible responses)—the suggestion is that the imagined scenario is one 
in which we can recognize the possibility of feeling sorry (in the relevant sense) without 
feeling guilty. 
Now consider a case in which you recklessly risk the safety of an indeterminate 
number of people, but through sheer good luck no harm occurs. On a night out you 
have several more cocktails than you planned, and decide to drive home when you 
should know better. On waking the next morning, you might feel guilty about what 
you’ve done (“What was I thinking? I could have killed someone!”), but without feel-
ing sorry towards anyone—after all, no one was hurt, and the people whose safety you 
risked are unidentifiable. Your feeling will naturally manifest itself in a disposition, for 
instance, to reproach yourself, rather than to apologize or make amends (to whom?). 
When you think about what happened, the focus will primarily be on yourself, your 
choices, and what you did, rather than on any other person. 
Again, the claim is not that this response would be more appropriate or more 
likely to occur than alternative possible responses. We could perhaps imagine, for in-
stance, someone in this scenario focusing instead on the people (either in particular or 
in the abstract) whose safety she risked, and orienting her emotional response around 
concern for, or contrition towards, them. The claim is rather that the more self-fo-
cused pattern of response here described is possible and intelligible (and, I again 
venture, familiar). 
For another example of feeling guilty without feeling sorry we can borrow a case 
imagined by R. Jay Wallace, in which a lapsed Catholic feels irrationally guilty for hav-
ing recreational sex, despite no longer endorsing the rule that this guilt is based on.10 
While Wallace does not remark on this aspect of the case, we can note that this person 
need not also feel sorry. He might, for instance, feel (irrationally) angry at himself and 
disposed to reproach or to punish himself, but without being disposed to apologize 
to, or feel sorry towards, anyone at all. 
The previous two examples are useful for isolating feelings of guilt from feelings 
of contrition because they involve no specific other person to whom it would obvi-
ously make sense to feel sorry. But it is quite possible to have only feelings of guilt 
even in cases where there is a readily identifiable victim. Suppose you allow yourself 
an intemperate remark addressed to a person whom you simply loathe. This person, 
you are convinced, deserved no better—indeed, much worse than what you said. And 
 
10 See Wallace, supra note 5, p. 43. 
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yet . . . you prefer to hold yourself to a higher standard. Far from feeling sorry or dis-
posed to apologize, you might continue to take satisfaction in having given this person 
a bit of what they had coming, even as you blame yourself for your lack of self-control. 
In this way, you might feel guilty, be disposed to reproach yourself, and so on, despite 
not feeling at all sorry towards the target of your remark. 
These cases thus distinguish two sorts of emotional reaction by their characteristic 
foci or objects of concern, among other features. As I have already noted, agent-fo-
cused responses like guilt have been extensively discussed in the literature on the 
nature of responsibility; other-focused responses like contrition have received less at-
tention in that literature, notwithstanding their familiarity in everyday experience. But 
in neighboring discussions11 we find treatments of two related phenomena that are 
useful for comparison: agent-regret and remorse.  
The notion of agent-regret was coined by Bernard Williams to highlight the spe-
cial concern that we have about our own actions, even when those actions are faultless 
or have a significance that is entirely beyond our control (as in his example of a driver 
who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child). Williams therefore conceives of 
agent-regret as an appropriate response to a very wide range of conduct (in contrast 
to remorse, which he conceives as a narrower subset of agent-regret that is restricted 
in its application to voluntary wrongdoing). At the same time, agent-regret’s scope is 
narrower than that of ordinary impersonal regret; one of the earmarks that distin-
guishes it from impersonal regret, Williams suggests, is that a desire to compensate or 
make reparation can be a natural expression of agent-regret.12 
Williams’s reference to other-directed responses like recompense and reparation 
indicates an important kinship between agent-regret and my notion of contrition. 
There are also, however, at least two important differences. First, whatever overlap 
there may be between them, the notion of agent-regret was introduced and conceived 
to serve quite different theoretical purposes. Williams sought to bring to light the full 
breadth of the special concern that we have about our own actions; despite invoking 
reparation as a possible expression of agent-regret, he was not directly concerned with 
the distinction between different foci or objects of concern that is central to the way I 
am conceiving of contrition. The notion of contrition thus more clearly isolates re-
sponses that are other-focused in the distinctive way I have described. Second, and 
related to this, the notion of agent-regret appears to apply much more broadly than 
contrition. I am conceiving of contrition in opposition to agent-focused responses like 
guilt, but there is no indication that Williams saw any similar opposition between 
agent-regret and guilt; rather, the more natural interpretation of Williams is that he 
understood agent-regret to be a basic concern that we have for our own conduct that 
is present as an element in experiences of both remorse and guilt, as well as a range of 
other responses like disappointment in oneself, shame at what one has done, and in-
deed contrition. Agent-regret is thus best seen as a perhaps necessary element or 
condition of contrition, but not a sufficient one. We can experience agent-regret, in 
other words, without feeling sorry towards anyone—even if feeling sorry may always 
involve an element of agent-regret. 
 
11 Such as those referenced supra notes 2-4. 
12 Williams, supra note 4, p. 28-29. More specifically, Williams suggests that it is natural 
in agent-regret, as it is not in impersonal regret, to feel that one should offer compen-
sation oneself, regardless of whether the damage is also covered by insurance. 
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Remorse, unlike agent-regret, has sometimes been conceived in opposition to 
guilt, and it is thus in discussions of remorse that we find the closest precedent to my 
notion of contrition or feeling sorry. In her influential treatment of the contrast be-
tween guilt and remorse, for instance, Gabriele Taylor suggests that “[t]he important 
feature of guilt is that the thought of the guilty concentrates on herself as the doer of 
the deed”; in remorse, by contrast, the agent’s “concentration of thought is . . . not on 
the self . . . but is on her actions and their consequences. It is more outward-looking” 
than guilt.13 It is characteristic of remorse, says Taylor, that “in feeling remorse the 
agent believes that she has done harm which she ought to try and repair,” whereas in 
guilt there may be no thought of harm or reparation at all, but only of her own trans-
gression.14 For this reason, Taylor concludes that remorse, unlike guilt, is not an 
“emotion of self-assessment.”15 
In these respects, Taylor’s conception of remorse is a close match with, and an 
important model for, my notion of contrition. But in other respects Taylor’s remorse 
is a thicker notion and a more moralized one, and it accordingly has a narrower range 
of application. Remorse, Taylor says, unlike impersonal regret, “never implies ac-
ceptance” of what has been done—“[i]t is impossible to feel remorse and yet believe 
that overall it was right to act as one did”; she also takes remorse to be a moral emotion 
in the sense that it requires “an awareness, more or less developed, of moral distinc-
tions, of what is right or wrong, honourable or disgraceful”; and she considers that the 
remorseful agent must see “himself as a responsible moral agent, and so sees whatever 
wrong he has done as an action (or omission) of his about the consequences of which 
he ought, if possible, to do something.”16 These further characterizations are repre-
sentative of much of the theoretical literature on remorse, in that remorse is often 
treated as implying an all-things-considered desire to have acted otherwise, as involv-
ing complex moral judgments, as being itself a significant moral achievement, as being 
an important or even a sufficient condition for forgiveness or suspension of punish-
ment, and so on.17  
I have no objection to conceiving of remorse in these thick, moralized ways, but 
I intend contrition or feeling sorry to be a thinner notion that applies to a broader 
range of responses. For instance, I wish to include the way you might feel sorry to-
wards your friend for cancelling your meeting, even when you see your conduct as 
morally permissible (even required), or indeed fail to conceive it in moral terms at all 
and see it simply as having hurt your friend’s feelings. This thinner notion of contrition 
puts the basic contrast with guilt and related responses into clearer relief, and (as we 
will see) provides the foundation we will need to begin to develop a general conception 
of taking responsibility. 
 
13 Taylor, supra note 4, pp. 97, 100. 
14 Ibid. pp. 103-104. 
15 Ibid. p. 99. A broadly similar way of distinguishing between guilt and remorse can be 
found in Deigh, supra note 4, p. 48, though Deigh does not attribute to remorse the 
further features discussed below that are found in Taylor. Deigh does, however, 
ground remorse directly in feelings of love or identification in a way that distinguishes 
his conception of remorse from my conception of contrition. 
16 Taylor, supra note 4, pp. 99, 107. 
17 For versions of several of these claims in a recent and sophisticated discussion of 
remorse, see Maslen, supra note 2, especially pp. 5-12. 
Holding Responsible and Taking Responsibility 
 9 
The notion of contrition or feeling sorry, and the contrast between this and agent-
directed responses like guilt, is now perhaps coming into focus. But before moving 
on, one final observation in favor of distinguishing these two types of response con-
cerns an important structural feature. As Strawson observed, the second-personal 
responses associated with holding responsible also have first- and third-personal ver-
sions: I can be angry or resentful towards myself for what I have done to you, just as 
you can be angry or resentful towards me (similarly, I can reproach or punish myself, 
just as you can reproach or punish me). But contrition, in contrast, is a first-personal 
response with no second- or third-personal analogue: You cannot feel sorry towards 
yourself for the way I have treated you in anything like the way in which I can feel sorry 
towards you (just as you cannot apologize or offer amends to yourself in anything like 
the way in which I can apologize or offer amends to you)—indeed, even trying to 
express this idea reveals its incoherence. 
Now, with this distinction between guilt and contrition in hand, we are in a posi-
tion to make the further distinction that I aim to draw between holding (oneself) responsible 
and taking responsibility in a very straightforward way. Whereas the characteristic emo-
tional dimension of holding oneself responsible is feeling guilty, the characteristic 
emotional dimension of taking responsibility is feeling sorry. Guilt, and holding oneself 
responsible, are agent-directed; contrition or feeling sorry, and taking responsibility, 
are directed towards the person whom one’s conduct has affected. Thus, the same 
cases that illustrate how someone can feel sorry but not guilty, and vice versa, also 
illustrate how it is possible both to hold oneself responsible without taking responsi-
bility, and to take responsibility without holding oneself responsible (though of course 
it is common and often appropriate to do both). The person who misses an appoint-
ment with a friend for excellent reasons may take responsibility (with respect to her 
friend) without holding herself responsible; similarly, the lucky drunk driver may hold 
herself responsible without taking responsibility (with respect to anyone). 
This confirms, as was previewed earlier, that I am giving somewhat special, stip-
ulative senses to the terms holding responsible and taking responsibility (as to the terms 
contrition and feeling sorry), in order to draw attention to a distinction that can otherwise 
easily be missed. In ordinary parlance, these terms are used more loosely; we do not 
typically have occasion to distinguish between finer senses of responsibility and what 
I am calling the taking versus the holding of it.18 Nonetheless, the examples we have 
considered highlight a significant distinction that I will use the terms holding responsible 
and taking responsibility to identify. 
If the foregoing is correct, we now have reason to think that taking responsibility 
and holding (oneself) responsible are distinct, but we lack as yet a satisfactory 
 
18 Also contrast my sense of ‘taking responsibility’ with the sense at issue in David 
Enoch, “Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency,” in Ulrike 
Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Ber-
nard Williams (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 95-132, and 
“Tort Liability and Taking Responsibility,” in John Oberdiek (ed.), Philosophical Foun-
dations of the Law of Torts (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 
250-71, in which ‘taking responsibility’ is conceived as a (possibly mental) action by 
which someone assumes responsibility for something that would otherwise not be their 
responsibility. This sense of ‘taking responsibility,’ consisting in the exercise of a kind 
of normative power, is not my topic. 
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conception of taking responsibility—of what it is, what it means, and why we do it. 
My goal in the rest of this paper is to sketch such a conception. But I will proceed 
indirectly, via a detour through Joseph Raz’s novel and resourceful treatment of re-
sponsibility for inadvertence. By borrowing and repurposing a core element of Raz’s 
account, I hope significantly to advance our understanding of taking responsibility. 
 
2 Raz on responsibility for inadvertence 
In the final two chapters of From Normativity to Responsibility,19 Raz is concerned 
with what we might call the puzzle of responsibility for inadvertence. The puzzle arises 
in the following way. On the one hand, we often hold ourselves and others responsible 
for various inadvertent failures: forgetting an appointment, accidentally botching a 
procedure, and so on. On the other hand, this can seem dubious: It is (relatively) easy 
to see why we are ‘on the hook’ for successful conduct that turns out just the way we 
intended, but harder to see why we should be on the hook for conduct that results 
inadvertently from failures of our powers. In particular, responsibility for inadvertent 
conduct appears to violate a plausible condition that would limit responsibility to con-
duct over which we successfully exercise some sort of control, and thereby subjects us 
to a potentially troubling kind of moral luck.20 There seems then to be at least some 
reason to think that we are on firmer ground in holding agents (including ourselves) 
responsible for conduct that is successfully guided by their powers than we are in 
holding them responsible for conduct that isn’t. 
Raz undertakes to show that this is wrong, and that we are often on firm ground 
in holding ourselves responsible for inadvertent conduct. While Raz is not attentive to 
the distinction drawn in the previous section between holding responsible and taking 
responsibility, in the course of developing his account he focuses on attitudes and 
responses that the agent takes towards herself as agent, rather than attitudes and re-
sponses that she takes towards the person affected by her conduct. For this reason Raz can 
only be read as offering an account of why we hold ourselves responsible, in my sense. 
Indeed, we could say that one of his significant innovations is to offer an explanation 
of our responsibility for inadvertent conduct in terms of why we hold ourselves re-
sponsible for such conduct. 
According to the principle of responsibility that Raz defends, we are responsible 
for “conduct that is the result of the functioning, successful or failed, of our powers of 
rational agency, provided those powers were not suspended in a way affecting the 
action.”21 By “powers of rational agency” Raz means quite broadly all of the powers 
that we can call upon in the service of our activity as rational agents who form and 
execute intentions in normal ways. Our powers of rational agency thus include our 
sub-personal capacities of memory, attention, perception, bodily control, will power, 
and all of the other abilities that we regularly call upon to translate our intentions into 
conduct.22 
 
19 Joseph Raz, From Normativity to Responsibility (Oxford and New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2011). 
20 See ibid. p. 243. For discussion of the conflict between moral luck and a plausible 
control condition on responsibility, see generally David Enoch & Andrei Marmor, “The 
Case Against Moral Luck,” Law and Philosophy 26 (2007): pp. 405-36. 
21 Raz, supra note 19, p. 231 (emphasis added). 
22 See ibid. pp. 2, 227. 
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Raz’s principle, then, makes us responsible not only for conduct that results from 
the successful functioning of our powers of rational agency, but also for conduct that 
results from failures of those powers23; as a result, it makes us responsible for a wide 
range of conduct that results from lapses of memory, coordination, will power, and all 
the rest (including some conduct traditionally classified as ‘negligent’). Thus, when you 
fail to pick up your child from school because you simply forgot; when you hit the car 
in front of you because your foot simply slipped off the brake; and so on, you are 
responsible for those inadvertent lapses, according to Raz.24 
But these examples do not quite convey the distinctive breadth of this view of 
responsibility for inadvertent conduct.25 Consider that one familiar position is that we 
can be responsible for an inadvertent lapse of memory, coordination, or the like, pro-
vided that the lapse is a manifestation of an objectionable character trait, attitude, or 
judgment. The idea is that someone can be responsible for forgetting a friend’s birth-
day, for instance, if this is a manifestation of insufficient concern for her friend.26 
Another common thought is that an agent can be responsible for an inadvertent lapse 
of memory, coordination, or the like, provided that the lapse is causally traceable to a 
previous error on her part that was not inadvertent. For instance, an agent can be re-
sponsible for forgetting a birthday if she had previously decided not to bother marking 
the birthday in her calendar, consciously disregarding the risk that she might later for-
get. Raz’s view goes further than either of these ideas: He says that someone who 
simply forgets a friend’s birthday—her memory just fails her on this occasion, as mem-
ories sometimes do—is responsible for the lapse even if her concern for her friend and 
her prior conduct have been entirely satisfactory, or even exemplary. 
In order to defend this broad view of our responsibility for inadvertence, Raz 
develops some new theoretical resources. He begins with the idea of a “domain of 
secure competence” whose boundaries are defined by the powers of rational agency 
that we “securely command.” The idea is that within our domains of secure compe-
tence we can be confident that (barring some competence-defeating condition, like a 
seizure) if we undertake to act we will succeed; we are entitled to act without reflecting 
on the prospects for success.27 
Any exercise of complex agency, Raz argues, presupposes the stable existence of 
a domain of secure competence. It is our confidence in our domains of secure com-
petence that allows us, for instance, to deliberate, decide, and act without constantly 
second-guessing ourselves or going back to verify the soundness of our deliberations28; 
in the same way, we rely on our domains of secure competence to navigate our physical 
world without constantly questioning and verifying the nature and extent of our basic 
abilities to control our bodies and manipulate our surroundings. Without taking a 
 
23 With the important qualification, to be explained below, that we are only responsible 
for failures of our powers that fall within what Raz calls our “domain of secure com-
petence.” See ibid. pp. 244-45. 
24 See ibid. pp. 244, 267. 
25 On this distinctive breadth, see also Gary Watson, “Raz on Responsibility,” Criminal 
Law and Philosophy 10 (2016): pp. 395-409, 399. 
26 This example is from Angela M. Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and 
Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (2) (2005): pp. 236-71, 236. 
27 See Raz, supra note 19, pp. 244-45, 268. 
28 See ibid. p. 250. 
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substantial domain of secure competence for granted, we would be unable to rely un-
reflectively on our various lower-level capacities in order to perform any complex 
action, and would be effectively paralyzed. 
Raz further contends that because possession of a domain of secure competence 
is an essential component of complex human agency, it is also central to our self-
conceptions and identities as agents. Our self-esteem, our self-respect, our pride (or 
shame) in who we are and what we can do, our sense of our own potential—and thus 
our projects and ambitions—“all these and various other self-directed attitudes and 
emotions depend in part on competence in using our faculties of rational agency.”29 
To have a shorthand for the complex of self-directed attitudes that Raz has in mind, I 
will refer to them collectively as one’s ‘self-conception as an agent.’ For Raz, our self-
conceptions as agents comprise many (though not all30) of those self-directed attitudes 
that are most critical to our senses of who we are, of our place in the world, and of 
our own worth. And according to Raz’s account, our self-conceptions as agents de-
pend on establishing and maintaining the domains of secure competence that we claim 
for ourselves. 
Because our domains of secure competence play a central role in our self-concep-
tions as agents, Raz argues that any failure to perform an act that the agent considers 
to be within her domain of secure competence has a special significance—it threatens 
to undermine her very self-conception as an agent: 
Failure to control conduct within our domain of secure competence 
threatens to undermine our self-esteem and our sense of who we are, 
what we are capable of, etc. We must react to it. We may conclude that 
we are no longer able securely to perform that kind of action. We have 
grown frail, our competence is diminishing. We come to recognize our 
limitations. Commonly this is not the case, and we do not allow it to 
be. We assert our competence by holding ourselves responsible for it. 
To disavow responsibility is to be false to who we are.31 
When this kind of failure occurs, Raz says, “We must react to it,” and there are two 
options: the agent can either revise her self-conception by conceding that her domain 
of secure competence is not as wide as she thought, or she can reassert her competence 
by holding herself responsible for the failure. (By this point it is clear that Raz’s account is 
concerned with holding oneself responsible, in my sense, rather than taking responsi-
bility. The agent’s focus in his account is squarely on herself, her performance, and her 
self-conception as an agent, rather than on the affected party.) 
This need to uphold our self-conceptions as agents, according to Raz’s account, 
explains our practice of holding ourselves responsible for the results of failures of our 
powers of rational agency: “In acknowledging responsibility for actions due to our 
rational powers we are simply affirming that they are our secure rational powers.”32 In 
other words, by holding ourselves responsible we rebut the threat that failures of our 
powers of rational agency pose to our domains of secure competence, and thereby 
reaffirm our self-conceptions as agents. By the same token, “To disavow responsibility 
 
29 Ibid. pp. 245, 268. 
30 Other important elements of our self-understandings include, for instance, “gender 
or ethnicity and their social meanings,” ibid. p. 239. 
31 Ibid. p. 245. 
32 Ibid. 
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is to be false to who we are,” because it is equivalent to renouncing our own self-
conceptions as agents.33  
To be clear, for Raz holding myself responsible is something more than simply 
acknowledging that the conduct in question is my conduct. I have forgotten what I had 
for dinner ten years ago today. I am ‘responsible’ for this in the sense that it is a reflec-
tion of my admittedly imperfect memory. At the same time, however, there is no 
pressure for me to hold myself responsible for forgetting (blame myself, reproach myself, 
etc.), because remembering such a minor detail years later is beyond the domain of 
secure competence that I claim for myself. In this sense—the sense that interests 
Raz—I am not (to be held) responsible for forgetting. 
Notably, Raz does not ever say that the need to rebut the threat to our self-con-
ceptions as agents furnishes us with a reason to hold ourselves responsible, or otherwise 
state that the connection between holding ourselves responsible and the need to rebut 
the threat is a rational one. His purposes may not require it to be, if I understand 
correctly (though he is not explicit on this point); his goal is to explain and justify our 
practice of holding ourselves responsible by illuminating that practice “in a way that 
enables us to understand its significance in our life.”34 The point, then, is perhaps that 
our practice of holding ourselves responsible has a significance in virtue of which it 
plays an essential role in maintaining our self-conceptions as agents, not that we should 
(or perhaps even could) in particular cases hold ourselves responsible for the reason that 
doing so upholds our self-conceptions as agents. 
It is worth pausing here to appreciate the resourcefulness of Raz’s proposal. By 
introducing the idea of a domain of secure competence and elaborating its role in our 
agency, Raz connects responsibility to what may have seemed a largely unrelated area 
of human concern: our vital interest in maintaining our self-conceptions as agents. 
This furnishes us with some useful new tools for understanding our responsibility 
practices, and in the next section I will put these to use in a different way. 
But first I want briefly to introduce two potentially troublesome issues that Raz’s 
account faces. I do this not in order to mount objections to the account or to raise the 
question of whether it succeeds on its own terms (this is beyond my scope35). My aim 
is rather to identify two questions that any account of this general kind will need to be 
able to answer. 
We have seen Raz to argue, first, that our self-conceptions as agents are threatened 
when our powers of rational agency fail within our domains of secure competence; 
and second, that holding oneself responsible for those failures is a way of removing 
the threat that they pose to our self-conceptions. But both steps, on closer inspection, 
raise questions. 
In the first place, why should we accept the strong claim that any failure of our 
powers of rational agency (aside from those due to recognized competence-defeating 
conditions) stands as a threat our self-conceptions as agents? Since we know that we 
are not infallible, it must be consistent with our self-conceptions that we are subject 
to a small but real probability of failure, even when we act within our domains of 
secure competence. As Raz acknowledges, “We are always liable to fail to control 
 
33 Ibid. p. 245.  
34 Ibid. p. 246. 
35 But to lay my cards on the table, I believe the two issues below, and particularly the 
second, could be developed into serious problems for Raz’s account. 
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actions within our sphere of secure competence, even when no competence-defeating 
condition obtains.”36 But if this is so, then why should occasional realizations of that 
possibility of failure—this time, my foot slips off the brake, etc.—threaten our self-
conceptions as agents at all?37 
In the second place, how is it that holding ourselves responsible for our failures 
functions to remove the threat that they are supposed to pose to our self-conceptions 
as agents? Raz says things like, “In acknowledging responsibility for actions due to our 
rational powers we are simply affirming that they are our secure rational powers.”38 But 
this requires explanation; it is, at least intuitively, one thing to “affirm” the scope of 
our powers of rational agency, and quite a different thing to hold ourselves responsible 
(for instance, by blaming, reproaching, or sanctioning ourselves). A self-reproach, or 
a self-sanction, is not itself an affirmation of my abilities. Raz thus needs some expla-
nation of how it is that holding ourselves responsible can accomplish the function that 
his account assigns it. 
For present purposes, to repeat, it is not necessary to consider what resources Raz 
may have to address these issues; the point is rather that these are questions that an 
account of this kind must answer. Having them on the table will be useful in develop-
ing out of some of Raz’s materials a fuller conception of taking responsibility—the 
task to which I now turn. 
 
3 Taking responsibility 
There is I think a vital insight at the core of Raz’s account, but I propose to de-
velop this insight in a different direction, towards a clearer conception of our practice 
of taking responsibility for deliberate conduct (rather than holding ourselves responsible 
for inadvertent conduct). By doing this I aim to put us in a better position to appreciate 
the distinctive and fundamental character of taking responsibility. 
As we have seen, a central feature of Raz’s approach is his narrow focus on the 
individual who is concerned with her own conduct and its implications for her self-
conception as an agent. For instance, a case in which “the glass we put on the table 
tumbles off it . . . [and] we tend to feel annoyance, and to blame ourselves”39 exhibits 
for Raz the full structure of responsibility: a threat to the agent’s self-conception that 
is addressed by the agent’s holding herself responsible through blaming herself. This 
tight focus on the individual agent, considered in isolation, is both fruitful and limiting. 
On the positive side of the ledger, Raz’s first-personal approach marks an inter-
esting contrast with influential accounts of responsibility that concentrate their 
attention on the second-personal perspective—that of the offended, blaming party 
who holds the agent responsible.40 Raz’s emphasis on the distinctive perspective and 
 
36 Raz, supra note 19, p. 246. 
37 Without an answer to this question, Raz’s account would have to sacrifice much of 
its distinctive breadth. For a related concern, focusing on the uncertain scope of Raz’s 
proviso that we are responsible for conduct that is the result of failures of our powers 
of rational agency only “provided those powers were not suspended in a way affecting 
the action,” see Watson, supra note 25, p. 408. 
38 Raz, supra note 19, p. 245 (emphasis added). 
39 Ibid. p. 245. 
40 I have in mind here again the views of Strawson and those working within the tra-
dition he founded, including Watson, supra note 5; Wallace, supra note 5; Pamela 
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concerns of the agent brings welcome and useful attention to the relatively overlooked 
half of transaction, and is I believe the source of his main insight.41 But on the other 
side of the ledger, Raz’s concern with the individual agent causes him, perhaps without 
noticing it, to emphasize holding oneself responsible to the neglect of taking respon-
sibility, and more generally to overlook the social or interpersonal dimension of our 
responsibility practices. 
As a way of developing a fuller conception of taking responsibility—of what it is, 
what it means, and why we do it—I propose to reckon with the social dimension of 
our responsibility practices that is absent from Raz’s picture. This will involve integrat-
ing Razian insights about the conditions of complex human agency with some basic 
but important platitudes concerning human psychology and sociality. In particular, it 
will be useful to attend to the essential role that other agents often play in our projects 
and activities, and the profound way in which we are often invested in others’ attitudes 
and dispositions. Enriching the picture in this way will naturally suggest a shift in focus 
from holding responsible to taking responsibility, and will bring into clearer view the 
distinct character and significance of taking responsibility. 
The starting point, then, is Raz’s notion of a domain of secure competence and 
his plausible suggestion that complex agency of any kind requires such a domain of 
competence within which we are entitled to act without reflecting on the prospects for 
success. We can take a first step beyond Raz’s picture by observing that, for human 
agents living in communities, the domain of secure competence also has a social di-
mension and plays a critical social role. To operate as an effective agent in the world, 
I need to be confident of my ability to place a glass on the table or to step on the brake 
at the appropriate moment; but to function as a full, participating member of my com-
munity, I also need to be able to hold myself out to others as someone who is able to do 
those things. When I accept a glass of red wine from my neighbor, for instance, I 
implicitly represent to her that I can be trusted to wield a glass securely in the normal 
manner, without undue risk to her upholstery. More generally, we are creatures who 
relate to and rely upon one another; we need not only to see ourselves as competent 
within certain domains, but for others to see us and acknowledge us as competent, 
and to treat us accordingly as potential partners in shared activities and forms of life.  
These observations are meant to be obvious and uncontroversial. Yet they are 
absent from Raz’s discussion of complex agency and domains of secure competence; 
by juxtaposing them against Raz’s purely asocial conception, an enriched picture of 
our self-conceptions as agents emerges. To fill in this picture we need only further 
observe that to be seen as incompetent by others, and thereby as unfit to participate 
in the various activities and projects that make up the life of our community, is not 
 
Hieronymi, “The Force and Fairness of Blame,” Philosophical Perspectives (Ethics) 18 
(2004): pp. 115-48; Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and 
Accountability (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 
2006); T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2008); and many others. 
41 Another writer who puts first-personal concerns and responses at the heart of her 
account of responsibility is Hilary Bok in Freedom and Responsibility (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1998). I cannot do justice here to Bok’s sophisticated account, 
which is of an entirely different character than either Raz’s account or the proposal I 
will advance below. 
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only to our serious material disadvantage, but also threatens our sense of who we are, 
of what we can do, and of our own worth. Our self-esteem, our self-respect, our pride 
(or shame) in who we are and what we can do, our sense of what social or cooperative 
activities are open to us—all of these aspects of our self-conceptions as agents depend 
on how we understand others to assess our domains of secure competence. That is, 
just as our domains of secure competence play a central role in our self-conceptions 
as agents, our understanding of others’ perceptions of our domains of secure competence 
plays a central role in our self-conceptions as agents.42 
And we need not stop here, for there is still more to our social self-conceptions 
as agents—they comprise not only our understanding of how others assess our sub-
personal powers of rational agency (like memory or physical coordination) and our 
skills and competences (like linguistic fluency or ability to drive) but also what Straw-
son called the quality of our wills. Normal, well-socialized agents (like us) care deeply 
not only about the quality of other agents’ wills towards us (as Strawson observed), 
but also about how other agents perceive our qualities of will.  
That is, we care greatly and intrinsically about whether others see us as well-mean-
ing, kind, reliable, trustworthy, and so on. This concern is grounded in our basic need 
to participate in cooperative, trusting, caring, and otherwise meaningful relationships. 
Someone who was not perceived as good-willed in various ways could never be 
trusted, befriended, or loved in the way that adults mutually love one another, and to 
realize that we were in this situation would once again threaten our very sense of who 
we are, of what we can do, and of our own worth.43  
Our self-conceptions as agents—our sense of what we can do, of the activities 
and forms of life that are open to us, of our potential roles and accomplishments, and 
so on—thus significantly depend on how we understand others to assess our qualities 
of will. We construct our practical identities, in important part, in light of how well 
suited we understand others to perceive us to be to participate on mutually acceptable 
terms in meaningful relationships and shared activities.  
As before, these further steps beyond Raz’s picture do not require any ambitious 
or controversial claims about human psychology or experience. They require only that 
we attend to and appreciate the significance of a set of familiar generic observations 
about the character of social life as most well-socialized, non-pathological individuals 
experience it, most of the time. 
Nonetheless, integrating these observations has a significant effect. For once 
these pieces are in place, we are in a position to identify an important new category of 
threats to our self-conceptions as agents. Part of being well-socialized, we have just 
 
42 The importance of recognition of these competences by others has also been em-
phasized, for different reasons, in the recognition theory literature. See, e.g., Axel 
Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel 
Anderson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 121-30; Joel Ander-
son & Axel Honneth, “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice,” in John 
Christman & Joel Anderson (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 127–49, 130-31. 
43 Cf. Pamela Hieronymi’s observation, “It . . . seems quite plausible that standing in 
relations in which the quality of one’s will is recognized, both by oneself and by others, 
is of considerable importance. A change in what you or another person thinks about 
the quality of your will, in itself, changes your relations with them,” supra note 40, 124. 
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said, is that our self-conceptions as agents incorporate our understanding of how var-
ious others assess our competences and qualities of will. And this means that when we 
come to understand that there has been some significant negative change in how oth-
ers see us, this will tend to undermine and degrade our self-conceptions as agents. In 
this way, the discovery that someone’s assessment of you has changed for the worse 
(or that it has never been what you hoped it to be) can constitute a threat to your self-
conception as an agent.  
Often, these threats concern our understanding of how others perceive our qual-
ities of will. This will be the case, for instance, when we are discovered to have 
conducted ourselves in some way—for instance, in an ill-willed or vicious manner—
that belies a positive view of ourselves that we had understood others to accept, such 
as a view of ourselves as worthy of trust, respect, or admiration. When we perceive 
that we will no longer be trusted, respected, or admired in the same way as before, this 
tends at least to some degree to undermine and degrade our self-conceptions as 
agents.44  
Recall now the first question raised for Raz’s account at the end of the previous 
section: How exactly does the relevant conduct threaten our self-conceptions as 
agents? I suggested there that for Raz’s account to succeed it would need to be spelled 
out why a simple failure to perform some action within our domain of secure compe-
tence should threaten our self-conceptions as agents. But here, with respect to the 
social dimension of our self-conceptions as agents, the mechanism of the threat is 
already fully apparent. Our self-conceptions as agents include our understanding of 
how others assess our qualities of will; when we act poorly, we often know from the 
accusation and disappointment in others’ eyes (or from other signs, or indeed by in-
ference) that the relevant assessments have changed. In this situation (at least, without 
some effective response from us) we cannot go on as before, secure in our previously-
held self-conceptions as agents. The threat is simply that we are confronted with the 
fact that something we had incorporated into our self-conceptions as agents is no 
longer the case. 
One possible response to such a threat is resignation, accompanied by a painful 
revision of our self-conceptions as agents to reflect the diminution in our recognized 
eligibility to participate in shared forms of life. But this is not the only possible reac-
tion, particularly when the source of the problem is our own poor conduct; at least 
sometimes, we manage instead to respond to others’ accusations and disappointment 
in a way that mollifies and appeases, and thereby restores us in their assessment and 
removes the threat. 
How do we manage this? The threat consists in our awareness that, because of 
something we did, we are no longer (for instance) trusted in the same way as before. 
 
44 Conversely, when our conduct displays our good will or virtue in a way that we 
perceive to impress or to provoke the gratitude or admiration of those whose percep-
tions matter to us, this naturally tends to reinforce or even enhance our self-
conceptions as agents. Here there is no threat, but rather an opportunity to incorporate 
these positive perceptions into our self-conceptions by claiming credit and by register-
ing others’ positive perceptions in feelings of gratification and pride. These positive 
first-personal responses could also be thought of as ways of taking responsibility, 
though for the reasons mentioned supra in note 6 the focus here will remain on nega-
tive responses. 
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A direct and often effective way to meet this kind of threat to our self-conceptions as 
agents is to manifest our commitment to vindicating our trustworthiness, good will, 
and general social eligibility. A convincing manifestation of this kind naturally tends to 
reassure others of our fitness to participate in meaningful relationships. And the way 
in which such a commitment to vindicate our good will and social eligibility is charac-
teristically made manifest is precisely by experiencing and expressing contrition, and 
by doing what is warranted to make amends and put ourselves back in the good graces 
of those whom our conduct has affected—that is, by taking responsibility for our con-
duct. 
This brings us to the second question raised for Raz’s account at the end of the 
previous section: How does holding ourselves responsible serve to address the threat? 
I suggested there that for Raz’s account to succeed it would need to be spelled out 
how holding ourselves responsible could perform the role that Raz’s account assigns 
it, of rebutting the threat to our self-conceptions as agents by affirming the scope of 
our secure competence. But here, with respect to the social dimension of our self-
conceptions as agents, the way in which taking responsibility functions to address the 
threat is again fully apparent. Taking responsibility reassures others of our fitness to 
participate in meaningful relationships and activities, because it is a manifestation of 
the fact that we value our relationships in the right way, that we take our infractions 
seriously, that we are unwilling to allow others to be disadvantaged through their reli-
ance on our good will, and that we are resolved to do better in the future. These 
functions unite the complex matrix of attitudes, dispositions, and responses that are 
characteristic of taking responsibility, including feeling contrition towards those one 
has affected, being disposed to apologize and make various gestures of penitence and 
conciliation, and being willing to repair or compensate for the harm done. 
In particular, feeling contrite or sorry towards those affected by our conduct plays 
a crucial role, because it demonstrates that our concern for the relationship and for 
the effect we have had is not merely instrumental, but intrinsic; we feel badly because 
we value others’ recognition of our good will, and the relationships that depend on 
this recognition, for their own sakes. By accepting our demonstrations of contrition, 
those whom we have affected indicate that their perceptions of our good will have 
been, at least to some significant extent, restored; when we receive these indications, 
the threat to our self-conceptions as agents is accordingly resolved. The familiar and 
distinctive feeling of relief that we experience when a heartfelt apology is accepted is 
one mark of the significance that others’ perceptions of our qualities of will have for 
our self-conceptions as agents. 
As appeared to be the case in Raz’s account, I do not wish to claim that the need 
to meet the threat to our self-conceptions as agents necessarily furnishes a reason to 
take responsibility, or that the connection between taking responsibility and the need 
to meet the threat is otherwise a rational one. My goal, similar to Raz’s (as I understand 
it), is rather to identify and illuminate our practice of taking responsibility “in a way 
that enables us to understand its significance in our life.”45 The point then is that our 
practice of taking responsibility has a significance in virtue of which it plays a role in 
maintaining our self-conceptions as agents, not that we should (or perhaps even could) 
take responsibility for the reason that doing so upholds our self-conceptions as agents. 
 
45 Raz, supra note 19, p. 246. 
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This proposal thus vindicates, via an alternative route, Raz’s insight that our con-
duct can threaten our self-conceptions as agents and that our responsibility practices 
can be understood as a way of registering, responding to, and (when conditions are 
favorable) resolving such threats. But in structure it is quite different from Raz’s ac-
count. For Raz, holding oneself responsible was conceived as an autopoietic act that 
reestablished the agent’s self-conception in a direct, unmediated way. In this alternative 
proposal taking responsibility’s connection to the agent’s self-conception is mediated 
by its interpersonal significance. The advantage of this approach is that the social di-
mension of our self-conceptions as agents helps to explain the aptness of taking 
responsibility as a response to threats to our self-conceptions. If the threat consists in 
our awareness of diminished eligibility in others’ eyes to participate in meaningful re-
lationships and activities with them, then an intrinsic concern for what has been done 
to those others and the relationship, together with a readiness to conciliate them and 
restore ourselves in their good graces, is just the kind of response that is called for.  
Moreover, the way in which, on this view, our self-conceptions as agents are 
bound up with our concern for others and for the relationships and activities that we 
participate in with them helps to explain the special, personal sense of urgency that is 
often a part of feeling sorry. If I hurt or offend someone, plausibly part of what makes 
taking responsibility make sense as a response is that I cannot tolerate being thought 
of as someone who holds the other and our relationship in so little regard—that’s not 
who I am. 
Before concluding, however, there is also a significant complication that is intro-
duced by the social dimension of our self-conceptions as agents. The practice of taking 
responsibility just described centrally involves our concern for others’ perceptions of 
us. But where perceptions are involved there is the possibility of error; this means that, 
in addition to the paradigmatic scenario in which you and I have common knowledge 
of the relevant facts (of the fact, for instance, that I have somehow mistreated you), 
there are two other scenarios to consider. In the first, I have (for instance) mistreated 
you but you are unaware of this; in the second, you mistakenly take me to have mis-
treated you when I have not. The foregoing discussion suggests that in the first case 
there would be no threat to my self-conception, while in the second case there would 
be a threat; and this might seem to entail that it would be inapt for me to take respon-
sibility in the first case but would be apt to do so in the second. On first blush, this 
seems both psychologically and normatively questionable. Moreover, it seems to sug-
gest a significant divergence between our practice of taking responsibility and our 
considered judgments of when an agent actually is responsible. 
On fuller consideration, I think these apparent difficulties are less serious than 
they may at first seem, though to see this will require further enriching the picture. 
Start with the first scenario, in which I have mistreated you but you are unaware of 
this. Here your perceptions of me will not have changed, and thus no revision of my 
self-conception as an agent is called for (at least with respect to those perceptions). 
And yet, having mistreated you am I not likely to feel, not merely regret, but contrition, 
including a desire to come clean, to apologize, and to make it up to you?  
Of course, I am; but this can be made sense of in terms of a few further familiar 
facts. A wide swath of our emotional lives consists in our attitudes about what various 
other people would think (and in particular, would think of us), if they knew what we 
know. The fact that an admired grandparent would approve of my career or accom-
plishments can be the basis for profound gratification and pride, even if the 
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grandparent is long dead; entire life projects can be motivated in this way. Similarly, if 
I would be deeply ashamed for you to learn of something I have done, I may be un-
comfortable in your presence and unable to meet your gaze, even if I have taken 
measures that guarantee you will never learn of it. This is because being in your pres-
ence makes salient to me what you would think if you knew, and this triggers intimations 
of the shame that I would feel—intimations that can be so strong and vivid as to be 
virtually indistinguishable from the real thing.  
This phenomenon generalizes, and explains why it is not ordinarily enough merely 
to be seen by others as (for instance) trustworthy if we know privately that we are 
not—that is, that relevant others would not so see us if they knew everything that we 
know. Maintaining such deceptions is ordinarily cognitively and emotionally draining, 
and also, at least with respect to our self-conceptions as agents, largely ineffectual. This 
is because our self-conceptions as agents tend to be sensitive, not only to what people 
actually think of us, but also to what they would think of us if they knew what we 
know. And an important upshot of this is that ordinarily the most effective way to feel 
secure in others’ trust is to convince oneself that one is in fact worthy of it. The 
knowledge that one is less trustworthy than others believe is thus often enough to 
subvert one’s self-conception as an agent, in the extended sense being developed here, 
even if others have not discovered this fact.  
It follows that my mistreatment of you can be the basis for feelings of contrition 
towards you, through my understanding of what you would think if you knew what I 
had done, even if I am confident that I can prevent you from ever knowing. And this 
is, moreover, both a basic psychological fact about us and a normatively attractive one 
that we tend to endorse on reflection and to value and cultivate in ourselves and one 
another. 
Consider now the second scenario, in which you mistakenly take me to have mis-
treated you when I have not. Here there is (let’s say) a change in your perceptions that 
threatens to disrupt my self-conception as someone whom you trust; and this would 
seem to render it apt for me to take responsibility—to feel contrition, to be disposed 
to apologize, and so on, in order to be restored in your good graces and resolve the 
threat. But doesn’t this seem odd, or even perverse?  
In a sense, admittedly, it is—but not, I think, in a way that should be taken to 
undermine the picture we have developed. First, we should not exaggerate the extent 
of the oddness; second, we should not forget that many aspects of our emotional lives 
can appear odd or perverse from the sometimes austere perspective of moral theory.  
Regarding the extent of the oddness, it is important to take into account the fact 
that any pressure to take responsibility in this scenario is liable be swamped or under-
cut by other factors. After all, where the threat to one’s self-conception as an agent 
consist in another’s error, it can often be deflected simply by correcting the error, for 
instance with an explanation or by avowing or presenting evidence of innocence. Tak-
ing responsibility is, moreover, frequently emotionally, and indeed materially, onerous; 
so it is easy to see why it would not present itself as the natural response in circum-
stances where pleading innocence may be an effective alternative. It is also significant 
that while others’ perceptions of our good will are important for our self-conceptions 
as agents, they are not the only important thing; taking responsibility as a response to 
another’s false perceptions is something we are often strongly disinclined to do on a 
number of grounds, including pride, a sense of integrity, and a commitment to basic 
fairness. These considerations are further bolstered by the fact that taking 
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responsibility, even when it is successful in restoring us in others’ good graces, is often 
humbling, and sometimes humiliating. To be humbled for what we have done is one 
thing; but to be humbled for what we have not in fact done often feels to us intolerable. 
And this, again, is a pattern of response that we tend to endorse on reflection and to 
encourage and cultivate. 
We should not, then, overestimate the pressure that false perceptions can put on 
us, in versions of this second scenario, to take responsibility. Yet at the same time, we 
should not indulge in the rationalistic illusion that such pressure does not exist. The 
blame or disapproval of those whose views matter to us can touch us very deeply. 
Even where we have the strength of conviction, or other emotional resources, suffi-
cient to refuse responsibility and resist contrition, the pressure exerted by others’ 
blame is frequently redirected and appears in other forms, such as a sense of grievance 
or indignation (“How could she think me capable of that?”). A different kind of redi-
rection occurs when the sense of contrition is, in a simultaneously conciliatory and 
face-saving maneuver, attached to an object other than the perceived fault (“I’m sorry 
that this misunderstanding has arisen between us”46). 
Conversely, the pressure of blame will be most likely to provoke a direct response 
in the form of contrition for something the agent did not do, in versions of the sce-
nario in which simply pleading innocence is not a viable alternative (for example, 
because the agent lacks the credibility or standing to do so effectively), and where the 
agent lacks the maturity, pride, integrity, or sense of self that otherwise might provide 
a counterbalance. This means that the tendency to take responsibility and to feel con-
trition in the face of false perceptions will distribute itself in familiar ways around social 
hierarchies and other disparities of power, and will accordingly be subject to exploita-
tion for purposes manipulation or domination. For these reasons, it seems best to 
discourage the tendency to take responsibility and to feel contrition in these circum-
stances—as we might say, inappropriately or irrationally. We might even prefer to 
withhold the labels, and to say that in this scenario these responses would not count 
as real contrition, or as the real taking of responsibility, but only as deviant or degen-
erate cases. That is fine, and perhaps salutary, but need not prevent us from 
appreciating the structural and other similarities between these inappropriate or devi-
ant responses and more paradigmatic cases of taking responsibility.47 
Finally, in light of this how should we understand the relation between our prac-
tice of taking responsibility and what it is to be responsible more generally? As I noted 
at the outset, the nature and conditions of responsibility are not my topic; my more 
limited aim has been to advance our understanding of certain responses and practices 
that are associated with responsibility. Nevertheless, we would expect to find some 
close and systematic connection between our practice of taking responsibility and what 
it is to be responsible. I have offered some reasons to think that the divergences be-
tween them may not be as wide as a first glance at scenarios involving false perceptions 
might suggest, but those divergences cannot be made to disappear altogether; accord-
ing to the picture that we have developed we would not expect, even in a well-
 
46 Here the useful ambiguity of “sorry” as a possible expression of either contrition or 
impersonal regret often plays an important role. 
47 For a related point about the appropriateness of emotional responses, see Justin 
D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson, “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of 
Emotions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXI (2000): pp. 65-90. 
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socialized and self-possessed agent, that contrition and responsibility will always go 
hand in hand. 
What this means is that if we aim, in a Strawsonian spirit, to understand what it is 
to be responsible in terms of our practice of taking responsibility (and to repeat, this 
has not been my aim here), this understanding will have to involve some degree of 
idealization. We cannot simply say, for instance, that for an agent to be responsible just 
is for it to be apt for her to take responsibility. Any plausible account along these lines 
will have to incorporate at least some qualifications and conditions concerning (no 
doubt among other things) the knowledge and states of mind of the relevant parties. 
But this should be expected; our actual practice of taking responsibility (like our prac-
tice of holding responsible) is a very human and therefore untidy institution, whereas 
our idea of what it is to be responsible is a moralized abstraction. It is no surprise if 
the connection between these two things, however essential, should turn out not to be 
entirely simple and direct. 
 
4 Conclusion 
I have sought to identify a connection between our sociality and our self-concep-
tions as agents, and to show how this connection can help to make sense of the unduly 
neglected phenomenon of taking responsibility. A key inspiration has been Raz’s in-
sight that our own conduct can threaten our self-conceptions as agents and that our 
responsibility practices can be understood as a way of responding to such threats, but 
I have developed this idea in a different way, focusing on the manner in which our 
self-conceptions make reference to others’ attitudes towards us. 
This vindicates and expands upon the picture sketched at the outset, according to 
which taking responsibility has a fundamentally different character from holding responsible, 
including holding oneself responsible. To recap: Holding oneself responsible is similar 
to holding another person responsible; it consists in attitudes and responses that you 
take towards yourself as agent—blame, reproach, sanction, and so on. Taking respon-
sibility, on the other hand, functions as a response to threats of a certain kind to your 
social self-conception, and consistent with this orientation it consists of attitudes and 
responses you take towards the other as someone affected by your conduct and as a party to 
the relationship. Taking responsibility is thus complementary to but distinct from holding 
responsible. 
If this is right then taking responsibility turns out to be independently important 
and theoretically interesting, both in itself and, at least arguably, for the sake of under-
standing what it is to be responsible. Return to the case in which you cancel a meeting, 
disappointing your friend. It may be that your friend is merely disappointed rather than 
inclined to blame you or otherwise hold you responsible for this, and even that it would 
not be appropriate for her to do so under the circumstances (you had excellent rea-
son!); but even so, perhaps her disappointment lingers, casting a shadow over your 
relationship. Even if there are no grounds for blame, we have no difficulty whatever 
in grasping the notion that you are nonetheless responsible for cancelling the meet-
ing—not merely in the sense that canceling was something that you in fact did or that 
it was an expression of your agency or that it was attributable to you, but also in the 
further sense that in light of what you’ve done it makes sense to feel, respond, and act 
in ways that are distinctively associated with taking responsibility—including for in-
stance apologizing or making amends (‘making it up to her’). This suggests that to 
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focus solely on holding responsible is to miss an important dimension of our com-
monsense understanding of responsibility. 
Moreover, and finally, it begins to seem doubtful whether we can even fully un-
derstand what it means to hold someone responsible without also taking proper 
account of taking responsibility (and vice versa). After all, everyday experience shows 
that the two patterns of response are not merely complementary but interactive and 
interdependent. The blaming attitude by which I hold you responsible can, for in-
stance, be appeased and mollified by your demonstration of contrition; indeed, this 
may be the only way of truly satisfying me (rather than, say, merely distracting me, 
playing on my sympathies, or wearing me down). This is obviously more than just a 
curious regularity; it is a matter of some kind of responsiveness and fit. The tightness 
and apparent naturalness of these connections between holding responsible and taking 
responsibility suggest that these patterns of response are essentially embedded within, 
and to a significant extent derive their meanings and structures from, a wider emotional 
economy of interpersonal relations—an economy that is animated in large part by 
basic concerns that we share as active, social creatures, including our concern for the 
various meaningful connections that we can form with others, and the vital signifi-
cance of these connections for our own agency. In this light, our responsibility 
practices are revealed as likely to be grounded in a more complex matrix of concerns 
and responses than has often been supposed. 
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